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tional right to his job, he may at least assert that he cannot be fired for
reasons nor in a manner that constitutes infringement by the state of his
constitutional rights including the right to be free from arbitrary govern-
mental action. The public employee may even argue that Justice Holmes's
holding has been so emasculated that it should no longer be considered
valid. Many courts may agree with the court in Albaum v. Carey:
Whether we state the matter in traditional terms that government
largess is a property right within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment ... or whether we say that to deprive a government employee of
his job for exercising Constitutionally protected rights is to deprive of
the liberty guaranteed by that amendment, or whether we merely
reason that all government action with respect to its employees must
meet the standards imposed by the Amendment, our conclusion is the
same: the Federal Constitution requires every level of government
to afford nondiscriminatory and fair treatment, both substantively and
procedurally, to all its employees; conditions of governmental employ-
ment may not stifle fundamental liberties.93
The more recent cases have one essential element in common; each
recognizes that the state is always the state and no matter the capacity in
which it acts, be it employer or landlord, it is constrained by the Con-
stitution.94 When public employers, as well as the courts, recognize this
basic fact and act accordingly the public employee will truly have made
significant progress in protecting himself against arbitrary dismissal.93
BEN F. TENNILLE
NOTES
Admiralty-Recovery Under the Jones Act for Foreign Seamen:
The Demise of the Law of the Flag
"A vessel at sea may be a thing of beauty.., but.., she presents a
structure full of hazards for even the most experienced mariner."' This
283 F. Supp. at 9-10.
See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment
on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 751, 752 (1969).
" Hopefully, the entire task of protecting the rights of public employees will not
be left to the courts. See Rosenbloom, The Constitution and the Civil Service, Some
Recent Developments, Judicial and Political, 18 U. KAN. L. Rsv. 839 (1970) ; Note,
Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging Judicial Role, 66 COLUm. L. REv.
719 (1966).
'2 M. Nopus, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 612 (3d ed. 1970).
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is certainly as true for the foreign seaman as the American, yet United-
States courts have in the past been reluctant to extend coverage under the
Jones Act2 to foreign seamen proceeding against foreign shipowners.'
In 1920 Congress passed the Jones Act4 to provide injured seamen with
the rights and remedies afforded railway employees under the Federal
Employers' Liability Acts.5 The practical effect of this legislation was to
give to seamen a cause of action for negligence while abolishing the fellow-
servant rule6 and the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence.
7
One of the primary problems in dealing with the Jones Act has been
the proper ambit of the phrase "any seaman." When a foreign seaman
brings an action under the Act for personal injuries sustained aboard a
foreign vessel, the court must decide whether American law may or should
be applied. Conceivably, in international shipping, a number of nations
may be relevantly linked to the transaction. In the landmark decision,
Lauritzen v. Larsen,' the Supreme Court attempted to establish guidelines
in determining whether the Jones Act may be applied to the disposition'
of actions involving foreign contacts.
Justice Jackson began this elaborate opinion by stressing the im-
portance of comity and the need for respecting the laws of other sov-
ereignties. While recognizing that technically the Jones Act "conferred
an American right of action" on "any seaman," 9 he recognized the further
necessity of "reconciling our own with foreign interests and in accom-
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
""The Jones Act was passed for the welfare of A.terican seamen." The Mag-
dapur, 3 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (emphasis added). See also The
Paula, 91 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1937).
But see Arthur v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 72 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.
1934).
' Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his em-
ployment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees shall apply ....
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
545 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
' The fellow-servant rule holds that the employer is not liable for injuries to an
employee caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.
'Although after passage of the Jones Act contributory negligence was no bar
to recovery in an action against his employer, the rule of comparative negligence
was applied, and damages were reduced in proportion to the negligence of the in-
jured seaman. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
"345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Id. at 576.
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modating the reach of our own laws to those of other martime nations.""
The Jones Act was construed "to apply only to areas and transactions in
which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doc-
trines of international law."" This caveat was issued for consideration
when a choice of law was necessary:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity of mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided;
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to war-
rant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as
strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction. 12
Justice Jackson indicated that the proper way to avoid or resolve the
conflicts between competing laws was to ascertain points of contact between
the transaction and the governments involved and weigh the significance
of these contacts. Seven factors "generally conceded to influence choice
of law"' 3 were set out along with the weight and significance to be
accorded each. They were (1) place of the wrongful act, (2) law of the
flag, (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured, (4) allegiance of the de-
fendant shipowner, (5) place of the contract, (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum, and (7) the law of the forum.
Of these factors, it was said that "[p] erhaps the most venerable and
universal rule of maritime law ... is that which gives cardinal importance
to the law of the flag."' 4 Allowing the law of the ship's flag to govern torts
aboard a ship which might pass through numerous jurisdictions and spend
much time on the high seas added a dimension of predictability and pro-
vided a measure of uniformity. The Court re-emphasized " the sig-
nificance of the flag by holding that the "weight given to the ensign
overbears most other connecting events"'" and it "must prevail unless
some heavy counterweight appears."'
Despite the emphasis placed on the law of the flag, the Court recog-
nized the prevalence of "flags of convenience":
'ld. at 577.
11Id.1 2 Id. at 582.13Id. at 583.
1
'Id. at 584.t8The law of the flag had become settled American doctrine. See RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 405-06 (1934).
1 345 U.S. at 585.
17Id. at 586.
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[I]t is common knowledge that in recent years a practice has grown,
particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent shipping
laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries.
Confronted by such operations, our courts on occasion have pressed
beyond the formalities of more or less nominal foreign registration to
enforce against American shipowners the obligations which our law
places upon them.18
When the flag is one of convenience, its significance as a point of contact
diminishes, and there is a corresponding increase in the importance of the
allegiance of the shipowner.
Recognition of the flag-of-convenience problem by the Supreme Court
presaged a liberal trend in the application of the Lauritzen factors. It is
in dealing with vessels of "convenient". foreign registry that the greatest
extension in the application of the Jones Act to foreign seamen has oc-
curred and this is perhaps the area of greatest confusion. A review of the
ensuing decisions reveals the state of flux which evolved.
Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores9 began a series of Jones
Act decisions in the prolific, if not always consistent, District Court for
the Southern District of New York. A foreign seaman who had been in-
jured aboard a ship of Honduran registry owned by a Honduran com-
pany the stock of which was owned by an American company was allowed
to sue under the Jones Act. In disregarding the flag of the vessel, the
court expressed the belief that effect should be given to the nationality of
actual control of the ship. This decision was followed by holdings that
American ownership of the stock of the shipowning corporation alone was
not enough to justify the application of the Jones Act.20 Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A."' then followed,
with a decision by the court that "majority ownership and control by
Americans of the corporate owner of the vessel represents sufficient contact
with the United States to justify the application of the Jones Act,"' but
cast doubt that the distinction between ownership and control was valid
and indicated a belief that American ownership alone was sufficient for
the Jones Act to apply. A retreat from this position was indicated in
18Id. at 587.
19 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).,
"Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping' Co., 149 F. Supp. 265 (S.D:N.Y.
1957); Argyros v. Polar Compania De Navegacion, Ltda., 146 F. Supp., 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
21 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
2 Id. at 238.
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Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading Co.23 in which the court held
that American stock ownership of the shipowning corporation, without
more, was insufficient for application of the Jones Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had earlier attempted to
inject a measure of stability into the application of the Lauritzen factors in
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc.24 Citing the "inherent vague-
ness" of the Lauritzen test, Judge Medina attempted a "restatement of
the method of approach and the principles to be applied."'25 He concluded
that the test was one of "substantial contacts," and held as substantial,
contacts that included remote United States ownership.2"
The Supreme Court addressed itself to the application of Lauritzen in
two noteworthy cases. In refusing to apply the Jones Act in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 2 7 it stressed again the need for
respect of the interests of foreign nations and advised the use of "circum-
spection" when "adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct
of our international relations."2 Although McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras29 did not concern the Jones Act, the
issue was whether American law extended to crews on foreign flag
vessels that were beneficially owned by a United States corporation. The
National Labor Relations Board, using a test relying on the relative
weight of American as compared with foreign contacts, had found that the
operations involved substantial United States contacts so as to require
application of American law. The Court rejected this "balancing of con-
tacts" theory, saying its use could "raise considerable disturbance not only
in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well."8 0
Even though the Court pierced the corporate veil and found American
owners, application of American law was not allowed. In a footnote, the
" 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
",263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
Id. at 439.
'
8 The defendant was a Liberian corporation the stock of which was held by a
Panamanian corporation, and citizens of the United States owned all the stock of
the Panamanian corporation. In addition, all the officers of the Liberian shipowning
corporation were American citizens and the company's principal place of business
was in New York City.
" 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The Romero decision has major significance in areas
of admiralty other than choice of law. For a more complete discussion of the case
see H. BAER, ADmrnALTY LAw OF THE SUPREmE CouRT § 5-1, at 104-11 (2d ed.
1969) and Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27
U. CH . L. Rxv. 1 (1959).
28 358 U.S. at 383.
" 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
30Id. at 19.
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Court again stressed the importance of the law of the flag in determining
the applicability of the Jones Act."' Prompted by this decision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre3 2 reconsidered the
"substantial contacts" test it had announced in Bartholomewm and, noting
that this test had been interpreted as limiting the dominating importance
of the law of the flag, recognized McCulloch as restoring that importance.
This was the development of the law preceding a direct conflict be-
tween the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals which ultimately
led to action by the Supreme Court in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.
84
Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.35 came before the second circuit
in 1966. Following its interpretation of McCulloch and its reasoning in
Tjonammn the court determined that, although the great majority of the
stock of the corporation that owned the vessel was owned by a permanent
resident alien of the United States who substantially controlled the ship
from New York, the flag was not a flag of convenience and its law should
prevail. Primary consideration was given to comity and it was noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has given no indication that the law of the
flag (when not a flag of convenience) is still not to be considered of para-
mount importance." 6 Judge Waterman dissented, noting that United
States courts do not hesitate to pierce the corporate veil to apply United
States law to Americans who have sought to circumvent their responsibility
by incorporating and registering their vessels abroad. It was his con-
tention that resident aliens were accorded the same constitutional pro-
tections as citizens and enjoyed the considerable benefits of resident alien
status and should therefore have imposed upon them the same duties and
obligations as citizens.
The facts in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis87 closely parallel those in
Tsakonites. The Greek flag vessel on which the injury occurred was
owned by a Panamanian corporation s that was in turn owned by a Greek
corporation operating from a base in New York. 9 Ninety-five per cent
" Id. n.9.
" 340 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
"3 See p. 324 supra.
'398 U.S. 306 (1970).
'K368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967).
o Id. at 429.
'o398 U.S. 306 (1970).
" The Panamanian corporation was in reality a holding company with no opera-
tional responsibilities in connection with the ship. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,
412 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1969).
" The company's principal office, employing seventy-five, was in New York. An
office of fifteen employees was located in New Orleans. Id. n.5.
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of the stock of the operating corporation was owned by a Greek citizen who
had resided in the United States since 1945.40
* The injured seaman, a Greek citizen, brought an action in the district
'court and sought recovery under the Jones Act.41 The court found the
American contacts "quite substantial" 42 and held the Jones Act applicable,
awarding damages of six thousand dollars.43 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed, finding the flag of the vessel "more symbolic than real.""
The court recognized that in Tsakonites the second circuit "reached a
contrary result on identical factors, '45 but favored the reasoned dissent of
Judge Waterman, rejecting outright the majority position.
. In light of the developments in the application of the Lauritzen test
to foreign vessels flying flags of convenience, culminating in the Tsakonites-
Rhoditis split, the Supreme Court granted Hellenic Lines' petition for
certiorari.4 6 In a five-to-three47 decision, the application of the Jones Act
by the fifth circuit was affirmed.
. Justice Douglas began the opinion by recognizing that the majority
of the Lauritzen factors operated against Jones Act jurisdiction, but
ountered by stating that the test was not meant to be mechanical nor the
facfors exhaustive. The test of "substantial contacts" formulated by the
."The owner had become a lawful permanent resident alien in 1952. 398 U.S. at309.0" The suit originated as a libel (complaint) in rem against the ship and in
personam against Universal Cargo Carriers and Hellenic Lines. After discovering
the. defendants' substantial United States contacts, Rhoditis successfully moved to
have the Jones Act applied. 412 F.2d at 920 n.4. Under the Jones Act, the suit is
in personam against the shipowner, and not against the ship itself. Plamals v. S.S.
'Tinar Del Rio," 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
"2In addition to the fact that the controlling corporation was based in New
York and owned by'a permanent 'resident alien of the' United States, the injury
occuried in a United States port and the entire income of the vessel was generated
ly cargo either originating or terminating in the United States. On the other hand,
b th the controlling corporation and its owner were in fact Greek, the vessel was
ri gistered in Greece, the injured seaman was a citizen of Greece, the contract of
employment was signed in Greece and specifically provided that the Greek legal
system should be used in settling any claims arising out of the contract, and relief
was apparently available in a -Greek forum.
" Rhoditis v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1967).
,"Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir. 1969).
"' Id. The resident alien shipowner was the same man in both Tsakonites and
Rhoditis, but the facts of the cases were not completely identical. The variations
were minor, however, and apparently of no consequence. See Note, Admiralty-
Choice of Lau-Jones Act Held Applicable in Action Against Resident Alien Ship-
o6ne# 44 TUL. L. Rzv. 347, 353 n.34 (1970).
"396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
" 'Chief Justice -Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented, with Justice
Harlan authoring the opinion. Justice Douglas wrote for the majority.
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second circuit in Bartholomew48 and the addition of "base of operations"
as a factor of importance by the court in Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine
Corp.,4" were cited favorably. The Court's unwillingness to allow the
owner a competitive advantage "by allowing him to escape the obligations
and responsibility""0 of the Jones Act echoed Judge Waterman's dissent in
Tsakonites.
Justice Harlan's dissent expressed a belief that the premises on which
Lauritzen was founded had been misconstrued by courts "that have taken
the phenomenon of 'convenient' foreign registry as a wedge for displacing
the law of the flag."'" The purpose of Lauritzen "was to reconcile the all-
embracing language of the Jones Act with ... principles of comity .... ,52
It was said that "contacts ... simply serve as an adequate nexus between
this country and defendant to assert jurisdiction in a case where Con-
gressional policy is otherwise furthered," and "have no bearing in them-
selves on whether Jones Act recovery is appropriate" no matter how "sub-
stantial or numerous. ' 8  Justice Harlan noted that only recently in
McCulloch the Court had declined to override the law of the flag where
there were substantial United States contacts including beneficial ownership
of the vessel by a United States company, and that perhaps the courts have
become "mesmerized by contacts."' 54
Although the Supreme Court in Lauritzen had accorded paramount
importance to the law of the flag in determining the applicability of the
Jones Act, tacit approval was given to the practice of looking beyond the
flag when the foreign registration of the vessel was "more or less nom-
inal." 5r Implementation of this decision has resulted in an increasingly
liberal trend in the determination of whether a flag is one of "convenience,"
and the lack of specific guidelines in making this determinaiton has re-
sulted in confusion in the case law. The need for clarification of what
exactly constitutes a "flag of convenience" and positive standards to apply
once this determination has been made was obviously indicated by the
Tsakonites-Rhoditis conflict. The Supreme Court in Rhoditis failed to
respond to these needs.
Beginning with Lauritzen, the Court's repeated emphasis on the lav;
"See pp. 324-25 supra.
"211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"0 398 U.S. at 310.
"Id. at 315.
rId. at 318.
"Id. at 315.
"Id. at 318.
"See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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of the flag established a position heavily relied on by the courts. The
treatment in Rhodits, whereby the flag was summarily relegated to a
position of insignificance, with no consideration of whether it was real
or illusory, undercuts this position. A reassessment of the significance
to be accorded this "most venerable"'56 factor was indicated. "Base of
operations" was approved as a factor due consideration, but there was no
prescription for its application. The Court's inconsistency and failure to
respond adequately to the needs revealed by the confused application of
Lauritzen will do little to order the confusion.
The reasoning that led to the Court's emphasis on respect for the rele-
vant interests of foreign nations and concern that our law should be
interpreted consistent with principles of international law in Lauritzen,
Romero, and McCulloch is as valid today as when dictated. The decision
in Rhoditis portends a broadening of the circumstances under which the
courts of the United States will permit utilization of the Jones Act by
aliens injured in the service of foreign vessels-a trend which could lead to
unwarranted consequences. It has been suggested that the "retaliations"
by foreign countries warned of in Lauritcn57 are not a threat where the
alien shipowner is a resident of the United States, 8 but the court in
Tsakonites found significant Greek contacts, 9 which Greece has a recog-
nized interest in protecting. Application of American law with its at-
tendant bountiful recoveries could effectively encumber foreign shipping,
and the threat of retaliations becomes more than a remote possibility. 0
The United States would look askance at the efforts of any foreign power
to impose its law-and thus burden our shipping industry-for the pur-
pose of adjudicating rights between American citizens created by Amer-
ican law.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
See text accompanying note 12 mpra.
Note, Admiralty-Conflict of Laws-Provisions of Jones Act Applicable So
As To Allow Recovery To Alien Seamen Injured In A United States Port On A
Foreign Flag Vessel Owned And Controlled By United States Alien Domiciliaries,
1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 247, 253-54 (1969); Note, 44 TUL. L. REv. 347, mupra note 45,
at 354, suggest that Greece has no interest to protect where the defendant shipowner,
though technically a citizen of Greece, is a resident of the United States.
"' In addition to the fact that the ship was registered in and flew the flag of
Greece and the injured plaintiff was a Greek citizen who had signed a contract in
Greece limiting his rights to those arising under Greek law, the court noted,
inter alia, that all the officers and directors as well as all the shareholders of
Hellenic Lines were Greek, the company maintained an office in Greece, and the crew
and officers of the ship were almost entirely Greek. 368 F.2d at 427-28.
"The Royal Greek Government filed a brief in the Supreme Court as Amicus
Curiae urging reversal of the fifth circuit's application of the Jones Act.
[Vol. 49
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In the face of the Court's apparent disregard of the law of the flag,
extension of the reasoning applied in Rhoditis would leave virtually no
contact insufficient for the application of American law. Maintenance
of a United States office could be the critical factor rendering a legitimate
foreign shipper liable under the Jones Act. Foreign shipowners are en-
couraged to locate their "base of operations" elsewhere, lest they are
forced to shoulder a burden they would not otherwise encounter.
Another necessary consequence of this decision is the additional
burden the already overcrowded United States courts can look forward
to in the way of unnecessary, unwarranted, and ill-advised litigation by
foreign seamen attempting to take advantage of the liberal provisions of
the Jones Act rather than proceeding in the appropriate foreign juris-
diction. The Supreme Court has held that the Jones Act is "welfare
legislation .. .entitled to a liberal construction to accomplish its benef-
icent purposes."'" This pronouncement is in line with a trend in ad-
miralty law manifested most recently by the decision in Rhoditis. Despite
the humanitarianism of this action, reasoned, logical, consistent develop-
ment of the law is perhaps more to be desired. An examination by the
Court, not only of the direction of their decisions in this area, but of the
motivating forces behind them might well be in order."2
JOHN E. HODGE, JR.
Admiralty-Wrongful Death Action Under General Maritime Law
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.' the Supreme Court of the
United States held for the first time that an action will lie under general
maritime law for death caused by a violation of maritime duties. In so
holding, the court specifically overruled an 1886 decision' and took a
giant stride toward clearing up what had become a legal morass of anom-
alies and inequities.
The plaintiff in Moragne, alleging both negligence and unseaworthi-
ness, sued in a Florida state court seeking to recover damages from a
shipowner for the wrongful death of her husband, a longshoreman, aboard
a vessel on navigable waters within the state of Florida. The suit was
"E.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McCallister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
' See H. BAER, supra note 27, at 192.
1398 U.S. 375 (1970).
'The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
